Sharecropping and Investment in
Agriculture in Early Modern France PHILIP T. HOFFMAN The paper examines the spread of sharecropping that followed a wave of investment in agriculture in sixteenth-and seventeenth-century France. Using results from the modem theory of share contracts, it argues that sharecropping was a means of risk sharing that favored both landlords and tenants. Although the evidence used in this paper comes from France, the results may well apply to other areas of early modem Europe. contrast, allows the landlord and the person who actually farms the land to share the risks, which would seem to have advantages for both of them if they are risk averse. The opportunity to share the risk will in fact benefit both the landlord and sharecropper, but only under certain conditions. First, the landlord has to be able to enforce contracts that specify the work a sharecropper is to perform-how much plowing, how much hoeing, and so on. If contracts cannot be enforced, sharecroppers have a great incentive to undersupply labor, which would make landlords shy away from sharecropping. Second, at least one of two additional conditions has to be met:
1. There must be risks in the market for labor, land, or one of the other factors of production. These risks could involve, for example, having to pay higher and unpredictable wages for temporary laborers at harvest time. France, for its inefficiency and inequality are indisputable. Elucidating
